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CONSTITUTIONAL DECISION-MAKING
OUTSIDE THE COURTS
Michael J. Gerhardt*
INTRODUCTION

Constitutional scholars agree about remarkably little. We even
disagree about what counts as the Constitution. For example, many
constitutional scholars believe that the Twenty-Seventh Amendment is a
lawful addition to the Constitution; 1 but many other scholars believe
that the amendment was approved by dubious and probably illegitimate
means. Nor do they agree on whether the process by which it was added
to the Constitution is amenable to judicial review. Constitutional
scholars also sharply disagree about the appropriate methodology for
interpreting the Constitution. Constitutional scholars can, however,
agree on at least one thing-the very thing that brought us together for
this Symposium-the authority of H. Jefferson Powell as a
constitutional scholar. When Professor Powell speaks, people,
particularly constitutional scholars, should heed his call. Professor
Powell's erudition, eloquence, research, and insights about
constitutional law are, at least in my judgment, unparalleled among my

Arthur B. Hanson Professor of Law, William & Mary Law School.
I. Compare, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, The 27th Amendment Joins the Constitution, WALLST.J., May 13,
1992, at A IS (arguing that the amendment was validly ratified), with Richard L Berke, I 789 Amendment is
Rmifled but Now the Debate Begins, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 1992, at A1 (quoting Walter Dellinger's statement
•

that the amendment was incapable of ratification). The Twenty-Seventh Amendment states that "[n]o law,
varying the compensation for the services of the Senators and Representatives, shall take effect until an
election of Representatives shall have intervened." U.S. CONST. amend. xxvn.
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generation of constitutional scholars. So, when Professor Powell speaks
about foreign affairs, it behooves us to listen and to learn.
Professor Powell is distinctive (and distinguished) because he is one
of the few constitutional scholars who have contributed and written
extensively about a subject of keen interest to me-the Constitution
outside of the Court. 2 Legal scholars are regrettably preoccupied with
the work of the federal courts, particularly the U.S. Supreme Court. I
will not speculate as to why this obsession persists. Instead, my concern
is with its costs. In particular, this obsession leads to a lack of
appreciation for the extent to which national political leaders deliberate
over, and even shape, constitutional meaning. As Professor Philip
Bobbitt indicated, no systematic analysis of the quality and significance
of these deliberations has yet been undertaken.
My contribution to this Symposium will not fill this void. Instead,
my focus will be on the risks and costs of the scholarly preoccupation
with the Court, particularly with respect to how constitutional
authorities other than the Court take the Constitution into account in
deliberating over questions pertaining to constitutional meaning and
their constitutional authority. One such question is whether the
Constitution constrains or guides decision-making outside the courts? If
so, how does it do this? To answer these (and other fundamental
questions about the Constitution outside the Court), we need to examine
closely what national political authorities say and do about the
Constitution.

2. See, e.g., H. JEFFERSON POWELL, ThE PREsiDENT'S AUTHORITY OVER FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Carolina
Academic Press 1002); H. JEFFERSON POWELL, ThE CONSnnrriON AND THE ATTORNEYS GENERAL
(Carolina Academic Press 1999).
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THE TRADITIONAL MODALITIES OF CONSTITUTIONAL
ARGUMENTATION

At the outset, what national political leaders say about the
Constitution confirms Professor Bobbitt's trenchant insight, reiterated in
this Symposium, that they employ all six of the traditional modalities of
constitutional argumentation? Three examples illustrate the deployment
of these modalities in constitutional discourse outside the courts. The
first example is the federal impeachment process. Throughout the
impeachment proceedings against President Bill Clinton, both sides
made arguments based on text, history, precedent, ethos, structure, and
consequences.4 Those supporting President Clinton's ouster made the
following arguments: First, the constitutional text supports a single
standard of impeachable misconduct. Invariably, those seeking
President Clinton's removal argued that there is only a single,
constitutional clause spelling out the conditions for removal of those
officials subject to it. In particular, they inferred a single standard for
impeachment in the Constitution's particular provision subjecting ''the
President, Vice-President, and officers of the United States" to possible
removal for "Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes or
Misdemeanors."5 Second, proponents of the President's ouster argued
that history supported treating his misconduct as grounds for his
removal. They pointed out, for instance, that the Framers' generation
considered violating oaths to constitute a serious transgression,6 and the
3. See generally PHIUP C. Boaam, 1HE SHIELD OF ACHILLES: WAR, PEACE, AND TilE COURSE OF
HISTORY (Knopf2002). PHILLIP C. Boaam, CONSTmJTIONAL FATE (1982).
4. See generally 145 CONG. REC. S1,703, S1,703-18 (1999).
5. U.S. CoNST. art. Ill, § 4.
6. See Stephen B. Presser, Would George Washington Have Wanted Bill Clinton Impeached?, 67 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 666,669 (1999).
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Congress had previously removed federal judges for misconduct similar
to the President's misconduct. 7 Third, President Clinton's detractors
argued that judicial precedent counted against him as well. In particular,
they observed that the Supreme Court generally had left matters relating
to the President's (and other impeachable officials') removal to the
final, non-reviewable decision-making of the Congress. 8 Fourth, the
American ethos called for President Clinton's removal. In particular,
they argued that respect for the rule of law is indispensable for the
integrity and unique character of the federal judicial process in the
United States,9 and that the President had engaged in misconduct that
disgraced the White House. 1 Fifth, inferences and arguments derived
from the structure of the Constitution supported President Clinton's
removal. They invariably claimed that the President's lying under oath
constituted an attack against the federal judiciary. 11 Sixth, pragmatic
considerations weighed in favor of removing the President. They
argued that acquitting the President would encourage similarly bad
behavior from others 12 and even threaten his relationship with the
military, whose members could be court martialed for similar
misconduct. 13 Those opposed to President Clinton's removal drew on

°

7. TheBaclcgroundandHistoryof/mpeachmenJ: Judiclallmpeodunenl,1998 WL 781679(testimonyof
John C. Harrison, Professor of Law, University of Virginia).
8. See Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 249-50(1993) (White, J.,oonc:wring);seealsoMICHAELJ.
GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL IMPEACHMENT PROCESS 182 (2d cd., Univ. of Chi. Press 2000).
9. See U.S. Senate ConJinues Impeachment Trial, 1999 WL 55235 ("[President Clinton's] perverse
example inevitably undermines the integrity of both the office of the president and the judicial process.").
10. See generally RICHARD A POSNER, AN AFFAIR OF STATE: 1)fE INvESnGATION,IMPEACHMENT, AND
TluAL OF PREsiDENT WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON (Harvard Univ. Press 1999).
11. See David Schippers Questions Kenneth Starr at Judiciary Committee Hearing, 1998 WL 804443
("So when the President of the United States lies under oath ... and obstructs justice ... he is effectively
attacking the judicial branch of the United States constitutional government'').
12. Cf 145 Cong. Rec. S1,513, S1,523 (1999) ("[A]nyone who votes to acquit has to say that we are
going to hold this President to a1ower standard of conduct and behavior than we hold other people.'').
13. See id.
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the same modalities of argumentation. First, they claimed that the
constitutional text established an especially high threshold for
impeaching presidents. In their judgment, the text requires that the
misconduct for which a President may be removed has to be on the
same order of magnitude or seriousness as "Treason" or "Bribery." 14
Second, historical materials supported acquitting the President. In
particular, President Clinton's defenders argued that the Framers meant
to restrict bases for removal to a President's abuse of the unique powers
of his office, 15 and that the Congress had previously refused to sanction
presidents for personal misbehavior (for example, the House Judiciary
Committee refused to approve an article of impeachment against
President Richard Nixon for income tax fraud). 16 Third, judicial
precedent did not support, at least in the judgment of President Clinton's
defenders, treating President Clinton's misconduct as impeachable.
They argued that judicial precedents (and prosecutors) do not treat all
lies under oath as the same. 17 Fourth, the American ethos did not dictate
President Clinton's removal. In particular, they claimed, inter alia, lying
about sex is a sensitive, personal matter better left to mechanisms other
than impeachment, such as censure, the judgment of history, or even
criminal prosecution subsequent to his departure from office. 18 Fifth,
President Clinton's defenders argued that the structure of the
14. See History ofImpeachment, 1998 WL 786423 (testimony of Laurence H. Tribe, Tyler Professor of
Constitutional Law, Harvard University).
IS. See Cass R. Sunstein, Lessons from a Debacle: From Impeachment to Reform, S I FLA. L REv. 599,
606 (1999).
16. See White House Presentation-Day 1, 1998 WL 846806 (testimony of Elizabeth Holtzman, former
member of Congress from New York).
17. See White House Presentation-Day 2, 1998 WL 854460 (testimony of William F. Weld, former
Governor of Massachusetts); White House Presentation-Day 2, 1998 WL 854472 (testimony of Ronald K.
Noble, Associate Professor of Law, New York University).
18. See Sunstein, supra note I5, at 611.
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Constitution opposed transforming our government into a parliamentary
system in which the legislature may remove a chief executive in whom
it has lost confidence (or simply does not like). They claimed that the
President's misconduct was a purely personal failing and not an official
one! 9 Last but not least, President Clinton's defenders found that
pragmatic concerns weighed in favor of acquitting President Clinton.
Removing President Clinton, they claimed, would weaken the
presidency immeasurably; conceivably destroy the national, and perhaps
international, economy; and invite attacks--perhaps even domestic
attacks--against the United States.Z0
These arguments support Professor Bobbitt's insight that no authority
exists, or at least no obvious authority, on which there could be
consensus for prioritizing the different modalities of constitutional
argumentation. The federal political process seems to constitute a
crucible for measuring the relative strengths and significance of the
different modalities. Furthermore, these arguments reflect the obvious
concern among political leaders regarding constitutional authorization,
or limits, on their respective authorities.
Similar concerns appear to operate in another important realm outside
the Courts--namely, federal judicial selection, the second example
which demonstrates the use of the conventional modalities of
constitutional argumentation. The sharp divisions within the Senate
over judicial selection have been in place for some time. Republicans
blame the rejection of Robert Bork as a watershed event in judicial
selection, while Democrats suggest it dates as far back as to the
beginning of the Republic. However, each side justifies its position
19. See History ofImpeachment, 1998 WL 781680 (testimony of Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.).
20. See U.S. Representative Henry Hyde Holds Hearings on Impeachment of the President, 1998 WL
857487.
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regarding judicial nominations based on past practice and on structural
inferences about the Senate's authority in the confirmation process. A
recent argument supporting greater deference for judicial nominations
states that the Senate should not inquire into federal district or circuit
court nominees' ideologies because lower court judges have to follow
Supreme Court precedent, and therefore they have no discretion to
implement any disagreements they might have with Supreme Court
precedent.2 1 Frankly, I fmd this contention hard to take seriously, for
the simple reason that Republican senators do not appear to be prepared
to sign off on all lower court nominations regardless of the nominating
President's political party. The Clinton years demonstrate that, inter
alia, Republican Senators are not prepared to make this concession
because they (1) believe there are acceptable and unacceptable judicial
ideologies and (2) care deeply about ensuring the appointments of
judges with their preferred ideologies.
A third example that illustrates national political leaders' recourse to
the modalities of constitutional interpretation is foreign affairs.
Professor Powell's excellent book illustrates his own extraordinary
sensitivity to employing all the modalities of traditional constitutional
argumentation. Even those whom he criticizes employ these modalities.
Professor Powell points out, rightly I think, flaws in their use of these
modalities. Indeed, the main factor demonstrating whether Professor
Powell agrees or disagrees with the Office of Legal Counsel opinions is
the manner in which22 authoritative figures prioritize the modalities.
While it is tempting to think that political leaders will use the modality
21. See Ideology and Judicial Nominations: Hearing Before the Senate Judiciary Commiltee, 108th Cong.
(2001) (statement of Sen. Orrin G. Hatch); Thomas L. lipping, Winners and Losers Venus How You Play the
Game: Should Ideology Drivf! Judicial Selection?, 15 REGENT U. L. REV. 1, 10 (2002).
22. Cf. Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Many Faces ofJudicial Restraint, 1993 PUB. INT. L. REv. 3 ( 1993).
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that best supports their contention, one can see that national political
authorities, including lawyers, disagree vigorously over the
prioritization and proper interpretation of the various modalities. Thus,
it is easy to see that leaders care about the Constitution, but it is less
clear how and in what ways it matters, including whether it constrains
their decision-making. 23

II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL DECISION-MAKING OF POLITICAL
LEADERS

Another possible source of illumination on how the Constitution
constrains or guides constitutional decision-making outside the Court is
the activities of political leaders in foreign affairs. Does the
Constitution ever constrain presidents or members of Congress from
doing what they personally want to do in the realm of foreign affairs? It
is fair to say that Professor Powell cites no instance in which the
Constitution apparently has precluded, or barred, national political
leaders from doing what they were bent on doing in the realm of foreign
affairs. Is this because the Constitution exerts no constraint on them?
Or is it because the Constitution impacts their decision-making in some
other way(s)?
Consider two examples. The first example is President Abraham
Lincoln's unilateral suspension of habeas corpus.24 As soon as
President Lincoln had suspended habeas corpus, Chief Justice Taney
23. Professor PoweU suggests that this might not be the right question to ask. Instead, he suggests one
should think differently about how the Constitution operates, particularly outside the Court. I do not think
there is any disagreement between us. Here, I reiterate a point made previously that the critical question in
constitutional law is not how the Constitution constrains official decision-making, but rather how the
Constitution is implemented. See Michael J. Gerhardt, The End ofTheory, 96 Nw. U. L REv. 283 (2001).
24. See Exec. Order of Apr. 21, 1861; Sanford Levinson, Was the Emancipation Proclamation
Constitutional? Do We/Should We Care What the Answer Is?, 2001 U.ILL. L REv. 1135, 1144 (2001).
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·slapped him down; 25 the Congress later, however, ratified President
Lincoln's actions. 26 A possible lesson to be inferred from these actions
is that the Congress and the Chief Justice helped to curtail, or impose a
limit to, the illegality of President Lincoln's action. Another possible
lesson might be that the political branches-President Lincoln and the
Republican Congress-simply arrived where they wanted to go and
needed to get. If the Constitution constrained activity at all, it appears to
have constrained procedurally rather than substantively; it provided the
path that national political leaders had to follow in order to achieve their
preferred policy objectives.
The second example, foreign affairs, drives this dynamic home. It
appeared, for a long time, that war against Iraq had been inevitable. Bob
Woodward's new book is just one source that confirms the popular
suspicion that President George W. Bush had made up his mind to
invade Iraq long before the actual invasion took place.27 Initially, the
President had indicated a willingness to order the invasion without
explicit congressional acquiescence, but then in apparent response to
public pressure he sought and received an approving resolution passed
by the Congress. The President appeared resistant to get the approval of
the United Nations, but then begrudgingly allowed the United Nations
to address his concerns, including ordering further weapons inspections
in Iraq, before signaling his willingness to go ahead, with or without the
United Nations' approval. This sequence of decision-making fits neatly
into Professor Powell's conception of foreign affairs. This conception
seems to be that the Constitution creates a process for interaction
25. Ex parte Menirnan, 17 F. Cas. 144 (C.C.D. Md. 1861).
26. Act of Mar. 3, 1863, 12 Stat. 755 (1863); see also DANIELA. FARBER, LlNCOLN'SCoNSTinmON
(University of Chicago Press 2003).
21. See generally BoB WOODWARD, PLAN OF ATrACK (2004).
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between the President and the Congress over foreign affairs, but the
Constitution sets forth no substantive limit on what either branch may
do. So, we are left at the end of Professor Powell's book with a scenario
in which the Constitution seems to matter largely, if not wholly, for
creating a process for decision-making outside the courts.
CONCLUSION

In closing, I want to express some skepticism of the notion that the
Constitution provides no substantive check on presidential or
congressional authority in the realm of foreign affairs. In assessing the
Constitution outside the courts, we need to be careful to avoid
employing the conceptions, or mind-set, we commonly employ in
analyzing the Supreme Court. With the Court, there are winners and
losers. There are also substantive outcomes. There is also often the
cessation of a specific conflict, if not some resolution of a larger
question of constitutional meaning. It is, however, a mistake to think
that when the Court speaks it is the end of the story. In some cases, this
might be true, but more often than not, the Court's decisions are part of
a larger story or sequence of events. Bush v. Gore28 and Clinton v.
Jonel- 9 are just two examples of this common phenomenon.
We need to recall that one branch rarely has final or unchecked
authority on a subject. Indeed, the only realm in which this is
technically accurate is impeachment, over which the Congress exercises
sole formal authority. The common dynamic outside the courts is that
the parties must reach accommodations or face painful conflicts. These
accommodations occur on more than one level. Accommodations may
28. 531 u.s. 98 (2000).
29. 520 u.s. 681 (1997).
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exist at the constitutional level, which involve, as we know, a special
kind of politics-often referred to as "higher" politics as opposed to the
ordinary politics involved in the everyday machinations of the Nation's
capitol. These accommodations might sometimes be reflected in
ordinary law or other forms, including, for example, international trade
agreements such as NAFTA and treaties. In such circumstances, we
find ourselves back to where Chief Justice John Marshall in McCulloch
v. Marylancf 0 warned we would be, that is, recognizing that the
Constitution, in spite of what some might think, provides a "great
outline" or framework that channels decision-making on various
subjects.
Stated slightly differently, the critical question in
constitutional law, as reflected in foreign affairs (and other matters
outside the Court), is how constitutional values are implemented, that is,
how the Constitution is translated into action. If government respects
those channels and implements values pursuant to its constitutionally
granted authority (and procedures}, one cannot say that the Constitution
has no force outside of the courts. To the contrary, its force is evident
from its implementation. For this insight, among many other things, we
have Professor Jefferson Powell to thank.

30. 17 u.s. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).

